With no 'reasonable suspicion' required, black people are 23 times more likely to be targeted. The courts must address thisThis week a woman who was stopped and searched by police had a legal challenge dismissed by the court of appeal. Ann Juliette Roberts was travelling on a bus in September 2010 when a ticket inspector found she did not have enough money on her Oyster card. Roberts failed to provide her correct details, and told the inspector that she did not have any identification on her, which was not true.
A police officer arrived and searched Roberts under section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 – one of the most draconian stop-and-search powers available. He was able to do this as a senior officer had authorised the use of section 60 throughout the borough of Haringey, north London, on that day, meaning that any uniformed officer could search anyone for offensive weapons or dangerous instruments.
Unlike most other search powers, which require "reasonable suspicion", there was no need for the officer to suspect Roberts possessed such items. Indeed, it seems very likely that search was to ascertain whether Roberts was carrying identification.
Roberts, a 38-year-old woman of good character who worked locally as a special needs assistant, was handcuffed and restrained on the ground by officers. Unhappy about her treatment and concerned about the damage caused by the police use of stop and search in her community, she sought to challenge the lawfulness of the section 60 power.
Being of African-Caribbean heritage she was particularly concerned that the power is used disproportionately against black people. She argued that when officers are not required to meet an objective threshold such as reasonable suspicion, there is nothing to prevent stop-and-search decisions being made on an arbitrary and discriminatory basis.
Indeed, Ministry of Justice statistics show that nationally in 2009-2010 black people were stopped 23.5 times more frequently than white people, and Asian people 4.5 times more frequently. Tellingly, those figures are markedly lower for stop-and-search powers requiring reasonable suspicion. The inference is clear: when robust objective safeguards are removed, officers' subjective prejudices may take their place.
The case was first heard in May 2012, but was dismissed by the high court. On Tuesday an appeal against this decision was similarly dismissed by the court of appeal, which refused to engage with these statistics above.
Instead, it held that the power is not itself "intrinsically discriminatory", and was not exercised in a discriminatory way. In doing so, the court considered the issue in an absolute vacuum, and failed to show any appreciation of the reality of the impact on those subjected to stop and search.
Through my work as a police action solicitor and with the campaign group Stopwatch, I have spoken to many people who have been stopped and searched. Not only do they feel humiliated and embarrassed by the experience – which generally takes place in public – more importantly, they frequently also feel criminalised and victimised, and targeted because of their race. Significantly, these feelings appear to have become embedded in some communities, whose mistrust and resentment of the police are extremely damaging. Indeed, the Guardian/LSE study of the August 2011 riots noted that the "focus of much resentment was police use of stop and search".
The court's refusal to engage with such issues thus exposes a disconnect between the judiciary and society. Indeed, when the high court considered Roberts's case it made the astonishing assertion that, to people in Haringey, "the possibility of being subjected to a random search must seem a justifiable price to pay for greater security and protection from indiscriminate use of weapons".
I question both what qualifies the high court to speak on behalf of the citizens of Haringey and also what evidence can substantiate the claim. In 2009-2010 only 0.32% of section 60 searches – one in 300 – resulted in an individual being arrested for possession of an offensive weapon, raising serious questions about the effectiveness of the power in achieving security and/or protection.
It often feels that the problems caused by stop and search will continue indefinitely. Police practices are repeatedly criticised but still nothing appears to change. Last year the Home Office carried out a consultation in relation to stop and search, and comments made by home secretary Theresa May indicated that there would be some reform. Yet it seems that any such proposals have now been put on hold by Downing Street.
With no relief from parliament or the courts, what will it take for these issues to be properly addressed and the voices of affected communities to be heard? We can only hope that the supreme court will hear the case, and provide the answer. Reported by guardian.co.uk 9 hours ago.
A police officer arrived and searched Roberts under section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 – one of the most draconian stop-and-search powers available. He was able to do this as a senior officer had authorised the use of section 60 throughout the borough of Haringey, north London, on that day, meaning that any uniformed officer could search anyone for offensive weapons or dangerous instruments.
Unlike most other search powers, which require "reasonable suspicion", there was no need for the officer to suspect Roberts possessed such items. Indeed, it seems very likely that search was to ascertain whether Roberts was carrying identification.
Roberts, a 38-year-old woman of good character who worked locally as a special needs assistant, was handcuffed and restrained on the ground by officers. Unhappy about her treatment and concerned about the damage caused by the police use of stop and search in her community, she sought to challenge the lawfulness of the section 60 power.
Being of African-Caribbean heritage she was particularly concerned that the power is used disproportionately against black people. She argued that when officers are not required to meet an objective threshold such as reasonable suspicion, there is nothing to prevent stop-and-search decisions being made on an arbitrary and discriminatory basis.
Indeed, Ministry of Justice statistics show that nationally in 2009-2010 black people were stopped 23.5 times more frequently than white people, and Asian people 4.5 times more frequently. Tellingly, those figures are markedly lower for stop-and-search powers requiring reasonable suspicion. The inference is clear: when robust objective safeguards are removed, officers' subjective prejudices may take their place.
The case was first heard in May 2012, but was dismissed by the high court. On Tuesday an appeal against this decision was similarly dismissed by the court of appeal, which refused to engage with these statistics above.
Instead, it held that the power is not itself "intrinsically discriminatory", and was not exercised in a discriminatory way. In doing so, the court considered the issue in an absolute vacuum, and failed to show any appreciation of the reality of the impact on those subjected to stop and search.
Through my work as a police action solicitor and with the campaign group Stopwatch, I have spoken to many people who have been stopped and searched. Not only do they feel humiliated and embarrassed by the experience – which generally takes place in public – more importantly, they frequently also feel criminalised and victimised, and targeted because of their race. Significantly, these feelings appear to have become embedded in some communities, whose mistrust and resentment of the police are extremely damaging. Indeed, the Guardian/LSE study of the August 2011 riots noted that the "focus of much resentment was police use of stop and search".
The court's refusal to engage with such issues thus exposes a disconnect between the judiciary and society. Indeed, when the high court considered Roberts's case it made the astonishing assertion that, to people in Haringey, "the possibility of being subjected to a random search must seem a justifiable price to pay for greater security and protection from indiscriminate use of weapons".
I question both what qualifies the high court to speak on behalf of the citizens of Haringey and also what evidence can substantiate the claim. In 2009-2010 only 0.32% of section 60 searches – one in 300 – resulted in an individual being arrested for possession of an offensive weapon, raising serious questions about the effectiveness of the power in achieving security and/or protection.
It often feels that the problems caused by stop and search will continue indefinitely. Police practices are repeatedly criticised but still nothing appears to change. Last year the Home Office carried out a consultation in relation to stop and search, and comments made by home secretary Theresa May indicated that there would be some reform. Yet it seems that any such proposals have now been put on hold by Downing Street.
With no relief from parliament or the courts, what will it take for these issues to be properly addressed and the voices of affected communities to be heard? We can only hope that the supreme court will hear the case, and provide the answer. Reported by guardian.co.uk 9 hours ago.